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C00002 00002	fight[w85,jmc]		Picking a fight with western Europe
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fight[w85,jmc]		Picking a fight with western Europe

	For the U.S.A. to pick a fight with Western Europe
might have considerable advantages for both.

	1. For the last 40 years we have kept 300,000 troops in
Western Europe to deter the Soviet Union from attacking them,
even though Western Europe has a larger population and industrial
population than the Soviet Union or the United States.
In spite of this, it is said that if the Russians launched a
conventional attack and we didn't reply with nuclear weapons,
they would be at the English channel in a week.

	2. As many here and in Europe point out, this policy
of possible first use of nuclear weapons is dangerous for us,
for Europe and the world.  We have chosen to accept this danger
for lack of a better alternative.
	
	3. Western Europe has more than twice the population of
the Soviet Union and more than twice the industry.  In the past
Western Europe never considered itself weak compared to Russia.
Indeed Germany was willing to take on by itself an alliance of
which Russia was only one component and not the most important.

	4. The reason Western Europe doesn't match the Soviet
Union militarily is that each of its politicians and political
parties finds that electoral success depends on saving money on
defense.  Since the U.S. is defending them, is inclined to be
bossy from time to time, the presence of the soldier causes
strain, Soviet propaganda against U.S. presence has its successes
from time to time, there is unlikely to be much change as long
as the present relationship continues.

	5. The situation might be better if we weren't friends
with them.  If the relationship became hostile enough so that
they felt obliged to defend themselves against us, then they
would really rearm, and backward Russia would be regarded as
it used to be.

	6. Here are some possible ways of picking a quarrel.
We could declare that Yugoslavia is outside our defense
perimeter.  Unfortunately, I fear this wouldn't make the
Europeans mad enough.

	7. One way that might work is to propose a deal with
the Russians at their expense.  One such deal is that the U.S.
could propose to withdraw completely from West Berlin in exchange
for a Soviet agreement to abandon all relations with Nicaragua,
diplomatic, military and commercial.  The Russians wouldn't have
to agree to make the Europeans, and especially the Germans,
quite mad at us.  We could also unilaterally withdraw from
West Berlin.

	8. It might be especially important to get the British
mad at us.  Tip O'Neill and Teddy Kennedy could introduce bills
to support the IRA goal of taking over Northern Ireland.

	9. We could escalate a trade war.   A big trade
deal with the Japan at European expense might do it.

	10. We could prevent the prosecution of soldiers guilty
of robberies and rapes in Germany.

	11. The simple act of declaring a date for withdrawal
of our troops from Western Europe might suffice, but it should
be done more in anger than in sorrow to have the best effect.

	12. Probably it would be better to be kicked out than
to withdraw voluntarily.

	13. Some of the desired effects in arousing Western European
worries and hostility might be achieved merely by a significant
group of politicians pushing a hostile policy.  For example, a
Congressional bill to withdraw unilaterally from West Berlin
would have considerable effect if it came even close to passing
or if it passed and was vetoed.

	14. Proposals of the above nature might lead to negotiations
with the Europeans and also to negotiations with the Soviets.
In our negotiations with the Europeans, we should demand that they
support freedom elsewhere if they want our support in Europe.  The
biggest example was Vietnam.  One of the many ways we could have
avoided losing in Vietnam was with European troop support.  More
recently a policy of kicking the Syrians out of Lebanon would
have been feasible with European support.

	As for the Russians, perhaps they would concede something
to avoid the prospect of German nuclear weapons.

	There are some objections.

	1. In so far as our policy was directed at the goal of
making the Europeans stronger, they would see through it, and
there might not be much effect.  It would be better if the
hostility were genuine.

	2. It is thought that Europe might be Finlandized.  People
are vague about what that means, so it seems like something
the Europeans might accept, but consider two aspects of the
Finlandization of Finland.  First when someone escapes from
Russia across the Finnish border, the Finns send him back
if they catch him.  Finnish farmers, however, often conceal
escapees and help them get on to Sweden where they are safe.
Imagine the reaction in West Germany to a proposed policy of
giving back escapees across the Wall.  Second the press in
Finland is prevented from criticizing the Russians to the
extent that international events embarassing to the Russians
are often not reported at all.

	All this generates hostility to the Russians among
Finns.  Finland is too small a country for this hostility
to have much outlet.  If Western Europe were Finlandized,
the resulting hostility to the Russians could generate
rearmament.

	Still Finlandization followed by a Soviet takeover,
say at the start of a reversal of Finlandization, is a
possibility.

	3. Uninhibited Western European rearmament would naturally involve
West German nuclear weapons.  The ever-diminishing part of the population
that remembers World War II finds this a considerable disadvantage.  It
might just have to be accepted on the grounds that the present situation
is even more dangerous.  The installation of the Pershings gives us the
option of offering to sell them to the Germans when we withdraw our
troops.  While discussing with one German their negative attitude
towards the Pershings, it suddenly occurred to me to ask, what if
they were German missiles.  He said that in that case the attitude
of many Germans would be quite different.

	4. In my view the strongest objection to any variant of these
proposals is simple conservatism.  Unprecedented actions on our part
might generate unexpected actions on the part of others, e.g. the
Russians.  Maybe the present situation isn't
so bad.  Perhaps this objection is sufficient to justify delaying
action in the direction of picking a quarrel with Western Europe
until the defense situation gets much worse.  Maybe it never will.